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JUST THREE MISTAKES!
Major General John D. Altenburg, Jr.
The author asserts that three major Executive branch mistakes in 2001 and
2002 created the conditions for misunderstanding of international humanitarian law and the authority of the military to capture and detain unprivileged belligerents and conduct military commissions. His experience as a
career Army Judge Advocate and as the Convening Authority for Military
Commissions provides him with a unique perspective. He discusses early
Presidential decisions that undermined the good will of the international
community, generating critical reaction that forced the administration to
respond constantly to debates regarding domestic criminal law standards.
Rather, the administration should have engaged in meaningful discussions
of appropriate responses to non-state actors waging war and the appropriate application of international humanitarian law standards. The author
concludes that the administration’s arrogance and naïveté led to these
mistakes.
Three mistakes by the previous administration in the last quarter of
2001 laid the foundation for criticism that has persisted since that time.
Some of the criticism is well-founded; some has been disingenuous. A significant result of these mistakes has been inaccurate information communicated to the public.
The first mistake was the failure to pursue active public diplomacy
and education regarding international humanitarian law. The second mistake
was failure to conduct Third Geneva Convention Article 5 tribunals in Afghanistan and the concomitant decision to send large numbers of hastilyscreened detainees out of theater; and the third mistake was the failure to
design and implement, at an appropriate juncture, twenty-first century military commissions.
The current administration is at precisely the same crossroad in
2009. Decisions regarding combat operations, detention policy, detention
location, and the nature of twenty-first century war crimes trial venues, including military commissions, face the administration in September 2009. It
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is important to analyze the events of 2001 in order to inform critical decisions and policies in 2009.
Criticism of the President’s 2001 Military Order 1 and later the 2006
Military Commission Act 2 (MCA) as a forum for trying alleged war crimes
by members and supporters of al-Qaeda has focused precisely on the feature
that makes military commissions useful: the rules and procedures that differ
from U.S. domestic criminal trial practice procedures. These differences are
lawful and consistent with international legal standards, even though some
may consider them ill-advised for policy reasons. While it is true that military commissions have, historically and as a matter of custom, substantially
employed the procedural and evidentiary rules applicable at the time to
courts-martial, there always have been modifications. The best and most
recent example is the military commission as employed in the 1940s, when
the courts-martial rules were modified for commissions to allow hearsay,
closed sessions, and to provide finality through prompt review, but no appeal. 3 That exception to pre-existing custom, in the wake of the MCA, retains vitality as manifest in the statutory mandate 4 to employ other procedures and rules of evidence.
The commission is simply an instrumentality for the more efficient execution of the war powers vested in Congress and the power vested in the
President as the Commander-in-chief in war. In some instances . . . Congress has specifically recognized the commission as the proper war-court,
and in terms provided for the trial thereby of certain offenses. In general,
however, it has left to the President, and the military commanders
representing him, to employ the commission, as occasion may require, for
the investigation and punishment of the laws of war and other offences not
cognizable by court-martial. 5

While opinions vary on the vitality of the trials being conducted at
Guantánamo Bay, most would likely agree that the limited public acceptance by some sectors of the press, public, and academy in the U.S. and
1
Military Order No. 222, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
2
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
3
See COMM. OF ARMED SERVICES, AMENDING THE ARTICLES OF WAR TO IMPROVE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY JUSTICE, H.R. REP. NO. 80-1034, at 17–22 (1947), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/amend_articles.pdf. See also Military Order of
July 2, 1942, 3 C.F.R. 1308 (1938–1943); Proclamation No. 2561, 3 C.F.R. 309 (1938–
1943); Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sustein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a
Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT 261, 274–76 (2002) (discussing the
similarities between President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s military commissions in the
1940s to President Bush’s military commissions).
4
See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
5
WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 831 (1920).
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abroad of military commissions as a forum for trial of al-Qaeda and associated non-state actors is the result of a series of complex policy decisions
and attitudes. Policies change with the stroke of a pen, but attitudes and
public opinion frequently harden; the adage that “there’s no second chance
to make a first impression” applies with devastating force.
Discussions of the utility of military commissions as an appropriate
trial forum frequently find participants already polarized. Without suggesting that any specific policy, practice, or event created this polarization, it
seems fair to conclude that a combination of secrecy and exertion of unitary
executive power did much not only to prevent the education of the public
regarding wartime legal procedures available to the government, but also to
reduce proponents of military commissions to sporadic and ineffectual
counter punching. In hindsight, the (perhaps) well-intended secrecy that
surrounded the formulation and piecemeal implementation of military
commissions also served, whether intended or not, to encourage ignorance,
both in the public and the press, regarding the history and diversity of military tribunals generally, and the role of wartime military commissions specifically. This secrecy fostered skepticism and ill will; it produced a public
perception of the military commissions’ legitimacy as being defined by
those who opposed them, evaluated not as a flexible, historically based, and
evolving UCMJ 6 authorized war crimes trial forum, but rather as an untested shortcut to convictions, hopelessly intermeshed with detainee policy.
The U.S. is at war with al-Qaeda and Taliban members who support
it. When the war began is a point worth discussing. Some argue that it began in 1993 when al-Qaeda operatives bombed the World Trade Center in
New York City. This event is now characterized as World Trade Center I.
Others argue that it began in 1996 when Osama bin Laden declared war on
the U.S. or in 1998 when he repeated the declaration and specified that his
operatives should target and kill American civilians worldwide. Nearly all
would agree that bombing two U.S. embassies in western Africa in 1998 or
attacking a U.S. warship in 2000 qualify as wartime actions. There should
be no doubt that the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York
City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. ensured a state of war between
al-Qaeda and the U.S. But there are some who claim that because al-Qaeda
is a non-state actor all the events discussed above amount to mere criminal
activity that should be prosecuted with the domestic criminal law system. 7

6

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2006).
See, e.g., Juan R. Torruella, On the Slippery Slopes of Afghanistan: Military Commissions and the Exercise of Presidential Power, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 648, 725–27 (2001)
(cautioning against removing the Afghanistan detainees from the mainstream criminal law
system because of prior precedent treating both foreign and domestic terrorists like common
criminals).
7
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The problem of determining when the war will end or how we will
be able to tell when the war ends is worthy of a different discussion and
debate, but it does not alter the fact that we are currently at war. For the first
time in history, organizations of non-state actors are capable of mounting
offensive military operations worldwide, have more military capability than
half the nations of the world community, and possess economic clout which
matches or exceeds that of more than half the countries of the world. They
are “state-like” in only these three aspects, but these aspects are critical to
the national security of all nations. This is a thorny issue, but we should not
conclude that the U.S. cannot be at war because we cannot articulate how or
when we will be able to tell the war is concluded. It is important to note that
all security organizations to which the U.S. belongs invoked their selfdefense clauses in the fall of 2001 after the 9/11 attacks; such unprecedented action was not taken for law enforcement purposes.
What is worthy of discussion and debate is how to conduct the war,
how to detain combatants, what interrogation methods to employ, and if,
how, and when to prosecute those who are believed to have committed violations of the law of armed conflict. The terms of the discussion should be
within the framework of war principles, not law enforcement principles. A
nation may choose to prosecute certain offenders as criminals and employ
our domestic criminal justice system. But combatants captured by allied
forces mayand shouldbe detained and interrogated, if capturing powers
choose to question them within the principles of the law of armed conflict.
Decisions regarding whether, when, and where to prosecute those who violated the law of armed conflict should be made within the same principles.
There are many issues to discuss in connection with the ongoing
conflict, but we are at least eight years into the war and have little consensus
on several important questions. The main reason for the current confusion is
the singular inability of the U.S. administration in 2001 to communicate to
its citizens and to the rest of the world the nature of the conflictother than
sweeping blandishments about the “global war on terror.” The failure to
engage in public education and public diplomacy regarding unique aspects
of the law of armed conflict, like the right to detain until the war ends,
allowed critics to frame the terms of debate. Such efforts by organizations
and individuals are legitimate, but left unchallenged they may confuse the
public.
Non-government agencies naturally seek opportunities to advocate
for their beliefs, whether it is to modify the law of armed conflict itself, to
define anew which weapons systems and ammunition types are legitimate,
or to define terms and concepts; for example, the appropriate designation of
“child soldier.” When government representatives abdicate their responsibility to counter such claims, the public is left to conclude that the law is
what critics describe. In fact, frequently what critics persuade the public is
the law is what critics would like for the law to become. A simple example
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is that of defining “child soldier.” No doubt numerous organizations and
individuals would like for persons less than eighteen years old or less than
sixteen years old to be considered “child soldiers.” Perhaps someday international law will change to make it so. But the law is that “child soldier” is
someone less than the age of fifteen. 8 Wishing it to be otherwise or advocating it to be otherwise may be a laudable goal, but the lack of comment by
others has led many to believe that a fifteen year-old is a child soldier. It is
true that conscripting such young people is prohibited, but even then there is
no bar to holding them accountable for their actions.
The terms of debate regarding detention issues at Guantánamo Bay
in 2002 quickly became defined in the context of domestic criminal law.
The U.S. government failed to discuss publicly the universal and timehonored basis for detaining al-Qaeda and Taliban supporters captured in
Afghanistan and transferred to Guantánamo. Not one administration official
compared al-Qaeda detention to the more than 400,000 German and Italian
detainees who were in prison camps located in all forty-eight of the U.S.
states in 1944. None of those World War II detainees demanded lawyers or
trials; they understood the law of armed conflict and that the detaining power (the U.S.) was justified in detaining them until the war ended. In fact,
many detainees in 1944 could have argued that they were merely vehicle
drivers, cooks, or typists; they had not taken up arms against the allies. Most
were conscripted by their respective governments; they had not voluntarily
become part of the military force. But the law of armed conflict was clear;
all could be detained until the war ended, no matter how long that might be.
Yet no U.S. official in 2001 or 2002 drew this obvious comparison to help
the public understand the basis for detaining al-Qaeda operatives and supporters. Even allowing for the difference between Prisoner of War status
for most World War II detainees and the unlawful combatant status of today’s detainees, the public would have been served well by a better effort
from the administration to inform them of the wartime principles supporting
detention.
More significantly, not one administration official in 2002 spoke
publicly to compare the U.S. government’s position during the 1960s and
70s, when several hundred U.S. military personnel were detained by North
Vietnam. North Vietnam was not a signatory to the Geneva Conventions
and claimed that the detainees were war criminals, but took no steps to adjudicate these claims and did not follow the rudiments of international law
in its humanitarian or legal treatment of captured U.S. personnel. Still, the
U.S. never demanded their return, did not demand lawyers to represent
8
See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8.2(b)(xxvi), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (“‘[W]ar crimes’ means . . . conscripting or enlisting children under
the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to participate actively in
hostilities.”).
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them, and did not demand that they be prosecuted or released. Rather, the
U.S. government, through both Democratic and Republican administrations,
stated that it expected North Vietnam to treat the detainees with respect and
to return them to the U.S. when the war ended. In 1968 and 1969 few imagined that the war would end in 1973 for U.S. detainees. The nature of war
is that its end is difficult to predict. Those who claim we are not at war because we cannot articulate how we will define its end ignore the reality and
history of war to make their point.
Had the U.S. administration articulated forcefully in 2001 or 2002
that the law of armed conflict gives us the legal right to detain until the war
ends those captured on the battlefield, then we might sooner have had a
more focused debate regarding detention policy, whether to prosecute alleged war criminals sooner or later, and what forum to use once the decision
to prosecute was made. The arrogance of the administration, evidenced by
ignoring its obligation to educate and inform the public, combined with
critics who advocated not the existing law but the law as they would wish it
to be, created confusion that continues to this day. This failure of public
discourse by the government, combined with two other errors in judgment
mentioned above, led to mounting criticism of U.S. government policy once
the public adjusted to the shock of September 2001.
The most troubling and obvious error was the decision not to conduct Third Geneva Convention Article 5 tribunals in Afghanistan. It was not
necessary to conduct such tribunals for all detainees, but for the administration to conclude that there was “no doubt” as to the status of not only alQaeda operatives, but also all Taliban members and others captured was to
ignore the purpose and importance of Article 5 tribunals while also failing
to appreciate the advantage of conducting such tribunals. 9 The decision not
to conduct Article 5 tribunals was made in the face of unanimous opposition
from all uniformed attorneys (judge advocates) at every level of command.
Judge advocates are inclined to conduct Article 5 tribunals even when not
strictly required because they serve as an institutional safeguard for detention operations. Three commissioned officers, at least one of whom is a
judge advocate officer, objectively reviewing the facts and circumstances of
the detainee’s capture and detention, provide a significant internal control
measure for detention operations. At such hearings, the detainee is able to
describe personally his perspective on capture and detention and to provide

9
See generally Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf.
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information supporting his release or a detention category other than “unlawful combatant.” 10 If necessary, interpreters are provided. 11
Conducting Article 5 tribunals in Afghanistan would have produced
two significant benefits and no countervailing disadvantages. First, the mechanism itself would have revealed early not only possible intelligence failures but also any mistakes in point of capture operations and subsequent
detention operations. Second, Article 5 tribunals would have reinforced the
legitimacy of the detention regime in the eyes of the American public, world
opinion, and most importantly, the Supreme Court. Recall that Justice
O’Connor’s opinion in the Hamdi 12 decision, while acknowledging that the
U.S. was at war, strongly “advised” the government that tribunals to determine the appropriate status of the detainees would be important. Her thinly
veiled reference to Geneva Convention Article 5 tribunals led directly to the
establishment of the Combat Status Review Tribunal (CSRT). Unfortunately, by 2004 critics, because of the described failure of public education,
were already in full domestic criminal law mode and commenced to criticize the CSRT process because of perceived inadequacies when compared to
domestic criminal process. Ironically, the Guantánamo detainees have been
afforded the most extensive review procedures in the history of armed conflict. The CSRT process went far beyond that mandated by the Geneva
Conventions. The U.S. went even further in establishing annual Administrative Review Boards, an absolutely unprecedented mechanism not required
by international law. Yet because the terms of the debate remain domestic
criminal law, much of the public believes that the detainees must be released and that Guantánamo must be closed.
The other major error was the decision to pattern the November 13,
2001 Presidential Military Order (PMO) 13 so literally after the 1942 Presi10
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian
Internees and Other Detainees, Army Regulation 190–8, ch. 1, § 1–6 (1997), available at
http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r190_8.pdf (stating that “if any doubt arises” as to a
person’s classification, “such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention
until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal” and a tribunal
should determine the status of any person “not appearing to be entitled to prisoner of war
status” who “asserts that he or she is entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war . . . .”) [hereinafter Enemy Prisoners of War].
11
Enemy Prisoners of War, supra note 10, §1–6 e(5) (“Persons whose status is to be determined shall be allowed to attend all open sessions and will be provided with an interpreter
if necessary.”).
12
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (“Indeed, it is notable that military regulations already provide for such process in related instances, dictating that tribunals be made
available to determine the status of enemy detainees who assert prisoner-of-war status under
the Geneva Convention.”).
13
Military Order No. 222, supra note 1.
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dential Military Order establishing a military commission to prosecute alleged Nazi saboteurs. 14 The 1942 Presidential Military Order and subsequent trial had been affirmed 8-0 by the Supreme Court, 15 but the 1942 order was based on the 1920 Articles of War, which were amended by the
1948 Articles of War and then superseded by the 1950 Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ). 16 The UCMJ was subsequently amended significantly in 1968 and 1983. 17 The PMO drafters simply failed to consider
the effect of the preceding sixty years of jurisprudential developments in
military law.
Had government attorneys considered the development of military
law, they would not have insisted upon “creating” an ad hoc military commission process. Article 21 of the UCMJ provides ample legislative authority for the executive to conduct military commissions. 18 Article 36 of the
UCMJ provides additional authority to modify commission procedures, if
necessary. 19 Using the UCMJ and the current Manual for Courts-martial
(MCM) 20 as a starting point, attorneys could have analyzed MCM provisions to determine if they were practicable in twenty-first century military
commission trials of non-state actor unlawful combatants who had allegedly
violated the law of armed conflict. Where the court-martial provision was
adequate, it could be adopted by the commission process. Where the courtmartial provision was considered impracticable, the commission process
could be modified and an analysis provided in the developing “Manual for
Military Commissions.” Many believe that had such a methodology been
followed, then the critics of military commissions would have had much
less to discuss—even if they continued to be preoccupied with domestic
criminal law procedures for non-citizen alien unlawful combatants.
Actually, such a methodology was adopted by the Office of Military
Commissions (OMC) in late 2004 as individuals within the executive
branch debated differences among administration officials about detention
policy and military commission procedures. OMC attorneys worked from
14

Military Order of July 2, 1942, 3 C.F.R. 1308 (1938–1943).
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
16
Military Legal Resources History of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, http://www.
loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/UCMJ_LHP.html; H.R. REP. NO. 80-1034, at 1 (1947); 95
CONG. REC. 4120, at 1–2 (1949).
17
Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968); The Military
Justice Act of 1983: Hearing on S. 974 Before the Military Personnel and Compensation
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives,
98th Cong. 9 (1983).
18
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2006).
19
Id. § 836(a).
20
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (2008 ed.), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/
pdf/MCM-2008.pdf.
15
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October 2004 throughout 2005 and well into 2006 to develop a Manual for
Military Commissions (MMC) and a proposed UCMJ amendment (Article
135(a)). If adopted, these documents would have concisely updated UCMJ
military commission procedures to account for legislative and jurisprudential changes since 1948. Unfortunately, decision makers did not share the
enthusiasm of a group of Defense Department, National Security Council,
State Department, and Justice Department officials who urged the adoption
of proposed Article 135a and the proposed Manual for Military Commissions. 21 Once the Supreme Court decided Hamdan, 22 then Congress seized
the initiative and subsequently passed the Military Commission Act of
2006, 23 which is fraught with its own inconsistencies and inadequacies.
Three mistakes in the early twenty-first century spread misinformation, created critics, and strengthened existing critics. We live now with the
effects of those missteps. But the war continues; national security remains at
risk. Our reputation is damaged and the balancing must continue. How do
we achieve what has always been a challenging wartime balance? We must
protect our national security while upholding the rule of law. We did not do
that very well from 2001 to 2006. Perhaps in 2009, with a different administration in Washington, D.C., there can be the discussion and constructive
debates that should have occurred seven years ago. Discussion and debate
today should focus on the issues as they relate to the war paradigm in the
twenty-first century in the wake of several Supreme Court decisions. These
decisions acknowledge the fact that the U.S. is at war. Given that, how do
we reconcile national security interests and the rule of law? What is the way
forward?

21

See Statement by Major General John D. Altenburg, Jr. Before the Committee of Armed
Forces, at 3–4 (July 7, 2009), available at http://law.case.edu/lectures/files/20092010/20090911_1-AltenburgTestimonySASC-09.7.7.pdf.
22
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
23
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.

